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Models  of  Capitalism  
COLIN  CROUCH  
That  capitalist  economies  might  take  diverse  forms  has  been  long  recognised  by  
some  scholars.  Sometimes  this  diversity  has  been  seen  as  a  matter  of  evolutionary  
development.  This  was  true  of  Max  Weber’s  idea-­‐‑type  approach,  that  of  the  advocates  
of  postwar  modernisation  theory,  and  of  those  who  followed  Antonio  
Gramsci’s  identification  of  a  Fordist  phase  of  capitalism  that  was  deemed  to  
succeed  the  classic  free-­‐‑market  form.  This  last  idea  flourished  particularly  in  
the  French  re´gulationiste  school.1  These  approaches,  different  from  each  other  
though  they  are,  all  see  some  forms  of  capitalism  superseding,  and  as  therefore  
in  some  sense  superior  to,  earlier  modes.  Hence  these  are  not  theories  of  a  true  
diversity  in  the  sense  of  a  continuing  multiplicity  of  forms,  the  historical  superiority  
of  any  of  which  might  never  come  to  an  issue.  Analysts  willing  to  adopt  a  less  
historicist  approach  have  been  rarer.  The  modern  locus  classicus  was  Andrew  
Shonfield’s  work,2  which  examined  the  role  of  various  institutions  surrounding  
the  economy  –  various  branches  of  the  state,  banks,  Stock  exchanges  –  in  a  
number  of  Western  European  countries,  the  United  states  and  Japan.  Although  
he  thought  some  were  more  efficient  than  others  –  in  particular,  he  was  impressed  
by  those  that  inserted  some  elements  of  planning  into  otherwise  free  markets  –  he  
did  not  talk  in  terms  of  historical  transcendence.  
When  more  theoretically  inclined  political  scientists  and  sociologists  returned  
to  considering  economic  questions  in  the  1980s,  they  resumed  Shonfield’s  
concern  with  national  politico-­‐‑economic  systems  and  hence  national  varieties  of  
capitalism.  Occasionally  subtypes  would  be  recognised  within  a  national  
economy  (mainly  with  regard  to  Italy  and  Spain),  but  these  subtypes  have  
nearly  always  been  geographically  subdivided,  so  the  concept  of  territorially  
based  economies  has  been  retained.  This  does  not  mean  that  each  national-­‐‑state  
has  been  seen  as  embodying  its  own  unique  form  of  capitalism;  rather,  national  
cases  are  grouped  together  under  a  small  number  of  contrasted  types.  
This  literature  has  many  achievements.  It  has  provided  an  intellectual  counterweight  
to  easy  arguments  about  globalisation,  which  predict  an  inevitable  trend  
towards  similarity  among  the  world’s  economies.  Neoinstitutionalist  accounts  of  
diversity  have  provided  both  theoretical  arguments  and  some  empirical  demonstrations  
to  suggest  that  these  may  be  great  oversimplifications.  However,  if  we  
are  to  model  the  diversity  of  economic  institutions  more  scientifically,  and  particularly  
if  we  are  to  study  institutional  change  and  innovation,  Q1  we  need  to  deconstruct  
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the  taken  for  granted  wholes  of  contemporary  neoinstitutionalism  and  discover  
their  constituent  elements  –  elements  which  are  able  to  survive  in  combinations  
other  than  those  thus  identified.  
Acceptance  of  the  value  of  taking  this  approach  would  have  considerable  
implications  for  the  future  study  of  capitalist  diversity.  It  has  in  particular  a  
major  methodological  consequence:  empirical  cases  should  be  studied,  not  to  
determine  to  which  (singular)  of  a  number  of  theoretical  types  they  should  each  
be  allocated,  but  to  determine  which  (plural)  of  these  forms  are  to  be  found  
within  them,  in  roughly  what  proportions,  and  with  what  change  over  time.  This  
alternative  is  less  ambitious  than  the  current  fashion,  in  that  it  does  not  enable  
us  to  map  the  economic  world  with  a  few  parsimonious  categories.  But  it  is  
also  more  ambitious,  partly  because  it  corresponds  more  closely  to  the  requirements  
of  scientific  analysis,  but  also  because  it  is  able  to  accommodate  and  
account  for  change  taking  place  within  empirical  cases.  This  is  something  
which  most  of  the  neoinstitutionalist  literature  on  capitalist  diversity  finds  diffi-­‐‑  
cult  to  do,  leading  to  the  functionalism  and  determinism  of  much  of  its  analysis.  
The  aim  of  the  present  article  is  to  develop  this  critique  of  the  existing  literature,  
to  highlight  some  promising  recent  trends  and  to  point  towards  the  new  approach  
indicated  above.  This  last,  which  involves  first  deconstructing  into  constituent  
elements  and  then  being  ready  to  recombine  into  new  shapes  the  aggregated  
forms  of  currently  dominant  analyses,  is  developed  more  fully  elsewhere.3  
Pitfalls  in  the  formulation  of  types  
The  smallest  number  of  theoretical  types  consistent  with  the  idea  of  diversity  is  
two.  For  almost  all  writers  on  models  of  capitalism,  one  is  always  the  freemarket  
model  of  neoclassical  economics.  This  constitutes  the  principal  intellectual  
antagonist  for  neoinstitutionalists,  even  when  they  argue  that  it  accounts  for  only  a  
highly  specific  form  of  capitalism.4  There  must  be  at  least  one  other  form  to  make  
a  theory  of  diversity:  hence  dichotomies.  At  the  other  extreme  there  is  no  theoretical  
limit  to  the  number  of  forms  that  might  be  identified,  but  theories  rarely  
propose  more  than  five  or  six.  Given  the  relatively  small  number  of  empirical  
cases  of  advanced  capitalism  for  those  tied  to  a  national  case  approach  (currently  
around  25),  it  is  difficult  to  sustain  more  than  a  handful  of  types  without  lapsing  
into  empiricism.  
The  work  of  Michel  Albert,  who  made  the  original  contribution  to  dualistic  
analysis,  is  typical.5  He  modelled  two  types  of  capitalism,  which  were  seen  in  
an  antagonistic  relationship.  They  are  labelled  in  geocultural  terms  as  
Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  and  rhe´nan  (Rhenish).  The  former  defines  free-­‐‑market  capitalism,  
considered  to  be  embodied  in  the  Anglophone  countries.6  The  second  takes  its  
name  from  certain  characteristics  considered  to  be  common  to  the  riparian  
countries  of  the  Rhine:  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland,  more  problematically  
France.  However,  not  only  is  the  author  uncertain  whether  France’s  
institutions  fully  belong  to  this  type  (an  anxiety  which  was  one  of  his  main  
motives  in  writing  the  book),  but  Japan  and  Scandinavia  are  considered  to  be  
part  of  it.  The  broad  institutional  range  gathered  together  to  form  this  second  
type  is  disconcerting.  The  essential  idea  is  a  capacity  to  make  long-­‐‑term  decisions  
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that  maximise  certain  collective  rather  than  individual  goods.  But  this  means  
ignoring  differences  among  the  very  diverse  forms  of  collectivism  found.  
It  is  important  to  note  that  this  dualism  in  the  identification  of  types  of  economy  
parallels  the  debate  between  political  philosophies  –  neoliberalism  and  social  
democracy  –  which  lies  behind  the  analysis  and  behind  most  contemporary  political  
debate.7  This  has  created  some  confusion  over  whether  neoinstitutionalism’s  
confrontation  is  with  neoclassical  economics,  and  therefore  at  the  analytical  level  
only;  or  with  neoliberal  politics,  implying  an  ideological  confrontation;  or  with  all  
political  practices  associated  with  the  anti-­‐‑Keynesian  and  pro-­‐‑capitalist  forces  
which  came  to  prominence  during  the  period.  
One  form  taken  by  both  the  scientific  and  the  ideological  debate  has  been  
dispute  over  which  kind  of  capitalism  delivers  the  best  economic  performance.  
As  David  Coates  showed  in  his  study  of  models  of  capitalism,  this  has  been  an  
extraordinarily  difficult  issue  to  resolve.8  He  unravelled  the  complexities  of  the  
components  of  economic  growth  and  other  indicators  of  performance,  in  particular  
pointing  out  the  importance  for  comparative  studies  of  where  national  cases  have  
stood  at  particular  moments  in  relation  to  the  overall  evolution  of  the  world  capitalist  
system.  He  showed  how  it  had  been  a  mistake  for  institutionalists  to  seize  at  
various  times  on  particular  national  examples  as  proving  the  superiority  of  economies  
not  based  on  pure  markets:  the  models  selected  had  a  tendency  to  start  to  
under  perform.  Analysts  have  been  on  stronger  grounds  when  making  either  a  
weaker  or  a  different  claim.  The  former  is  that  various  kinds  of  institutional  
economy  can  do  just  as  well  as  (not  necessarily  better  than)  a  pure  market  one;  
the  latter  is  the  argument  that  institutional  economies  enabled  the  coexistence  
of  high  levels  of  economic  performance  alongside  the  pursuit  of  certain  other  
social  goals  (for  example,  a  relatively  egalitarian  incomes  distribution)  not  
readily  available  to  purer  market  economies.  
Neoclassical  analysis  considers  how  economic  actors  would  behave  if  a  world  
of  perfect  markets  existed.  It  usually  but  not  necessarily  incorporates  the  normative  
assumption  that  both  economy  and  society  would  be  improved  were  institutions  
to  take  this  form,  but  neoclassical  economists  are  at  liberty  to  consider  
that  this  may  not  always  constitute  a  practical  proposition;  they  are  not  bound  
by  their  analytical  approach  to  any  particular  policy  conclusions,  or  consider  
that  the  world  in  reality  takes  a  certain  form.  It  is  neoliberalism  which,  as  a  
political  creed  rather  than  a  form  of  analysis,  not  only  definitely  adopts  a  positive  
normative  evaluation  of  markets,  but  also  believes  that  they  could  always  be  
introduced  in  practice.  
But  in  practice  not  even  neoliberals  do  this.  A  by-­‐‑product  of  the  ideological  
dominance  of  neoliberalism  since  the  1980s,  and  in  particular  its  association  
with  the  most  powerful  nation-­‐‑state  on  earth  –  the  United  States  –  has  produced  
a  tendency  among  even  serious  analysts  to  assume  that  certain  practices  and  institutions  
constitute  part  of  the  neoliberal  paradigm  just  because  they  are  found  in  the  
US.  The  characteristics  of  the  neoliberal  model  are  derived  from  empirical  observation  
of  what  is  thought  to  be  its  main  empirical  example.  But  it  is  logically  
impossible  to  derive  the  characteristics  of  a  theoretical  category  from  the  characteristics  
of  an  example  of  it,  as  the  theoretical  characteristics  have  to  be  known  
before  a  case  can  be  considered  to  be  such  an  example.  For  example,  an  extremely  
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powerful,  scientifically  oriented  military  sector,  tying  a  number  of  contracting  
firms  into  close  and  necessarily  secretive  relations  with  central  government  
departments,  is  a  fundamental  attribute  of  the  US  economy,  and  central  to  much  
of  its  innovative  capacity  in  such  sectors  as  aerospace  and  computing.  The  operation  
of  such  a  military  sector  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  principles  of  either  
neoclassical  economics  or  neoliberal  politics.  Analysts  respond  to  this  in  two  
ways.  Some  just  ignore  the  existence  of  this  sector  and  its  special  characteristics  
in  their  account  of  the  US  economy.  For  example,  the  Organization  for  Economic  
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  felt  able  to  describe  the  US  as  a  country  
lacking  any  close  support  from  government  for  industry.9  Alternatively,  they  
argue  that  the  defence  sector  is  somehow  part  of  the  US  ‘liberal’  model,  
without  noting  the  difficulties  of  such  an  assumption.10  Indeed,  as  Campbell  and  
Pedersen  argue,  at  the  practical  level  neoliberalism  has  not  been  the  monolith  
that  both  its  advocates  and  opponents  set  it  up  to  be.11  Within  it  have  been  contained  
a  diversity  of  practices,  some  not  particularly  coherent  with  others.  Kjær  
and  Pedersen  point,  for  example,  to  clear  differences  from  the  normally  presented  
model  in  the  form  taken  by  so-­‐‑called  neoliberalism  in  Denmark,12  whilst  King  and  
Wood  have  even  demonstrated  significant  distinctions  between  the  neoliberalisms  
of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  in  the  1980s,  two  cases  normally  
seen  as  joint  paradigms.13  
The  collection  of  studies  edited  by  Peter  Hall  and  David  Soskice  under  the  
name  Varieties  of  Capitalism  represents  the  most  ambitious  and  significant  contribution  
to  date  of  the  dualist  approach.14  It  draws  much  from  Albert,  though  it  
barely  acknowledges  his  contribution.  Their  book  has  become  the  emblematic  
citation  for  all  studies  of  diversity  in  capitalist  economies.  It  is  also  an  example  
of  the  preoccupation  of  many  neoinstitutionalists  with  coming  to  terms  with  
and,  in  this  case,  eventually  becoming  absorbed  by,  an  idealised  version  of  
neoliberalism.  
It  seeks  not  only  to  allocate  every  developed  capitalist  economy  to  one  
or  other  of  two  categories,  but  derives  from  this  account  a  theory  of  comparative  
advantage  and  a  list  of  the  kind  of  products  in  which  the  country  will  specialise.15  
This  is  achieved  with  the  aid  of  certain  assumptions  concerning  what  constitutes  
radical  and  what  incremental  innovation  –  a  characteristic  which  is  considered  to  
differentiate  whole  classes  of  goods  and  services.  It  is  this  factor,  combined  with  
its  use  of  this  sectoral  analysis  to  account  for  certain  important  developments  in  
different  national  economies  during  the  1990s  which  has  made  the  account  so  
appealing.  
Despite  some  ambiguity  about  a  possible  third  model,  these  authors  work  with  
an  essentially  dualist  approach  along  the  rationale  outlined  above.  They  specify,  
first,  a  liberal  market  economy  (LME)  identified  with  neoliberal  policies,  
radical  innovation,  new  sectors  of  the  economy  and  the  Anglophone  countries  
(Australia,  Canada,  Ireland,  New  Zealand,  the  United  Kingdom,  but  primarily  
the  US).  Germany  is  at  the  centre  of  a  second  type,  called  a  coordinated  market  
economy  (CME),  where  social  and  political  institutions  engage  directly  in  
shaping  economic  action.  This  form  is  linked  to  social  democracy,  incremental  
innovation,  declining  economic  sectors  and  non-­‐‑Anglophone  countries.  
It  is  odd  that  the  core  linguistic  uniting  characteristic  of  the  LMEs,  the  only  
generalisation  
that  really  works,  is  never  actually  discussed  as  such.  More  aware  of  
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Irish  sensitivities  than  most  authors,  Hall  and  Soskice  always  talk  of  ‘Anglo-­‐‑Saxon  
and  Irish’  economies.  But,  perhaps  because  like  others  they  resist  the  far  simpler  
and  more  accurate  ‘Anglophone’,  they  miss  some  serious  potential  implications  of  
this.  For  example,  one  of  the  most  impressive  pieces  of  evidence  cited  by  them  to  
support  their  contention  that  radical  innovation  is  concentrated  in  LME  countries  
and  only  incremental  innovation  in  CMEs  is  work  carried  out  for  them  on  patent  
citations.16  This  reveals  a  strong  statistical  tendency  for  patents  taken  out  in  
Anglophone  countries  to  cite  scientific  sources,  while  those  taken  out  in  continental  
Europe  and  Japan  tend  to  cite  previous  patents  or  non-­‐‑scientific  sources.  The  six  
leading  countries  out  of  18  studied  are  all  Anglophone  (headed  by  Ireland).  Q2  Prime  
facie  distinction  between  radical  and  incremental  innovation  does  seem  to  be  well  
proxied  by  that  between  academic  and  product  citations,  and  one  can  see  this  being  
related  to  the  character  of  research  in  firms,  research  centres  and  universities.  But  
it  is  also  possible  that  firms  in  Anglophone  countries  are  more  likely  to  cite  articles  
in  the  overwhelmingly  Anglophone  literature  of  global  science  than  those  in  other  
countries.  Further,  liberal  market  economies  are  largely  defined  by  their  having  
characteristics  determined  by  common  law  traditions;  these  also  encourage  the  
use  of  patenting  of  innovations  to  a  greater  extent  than  civil  law  systems.  Therefore  
higher  levels  of  patenting  –  as  a  legal  device,  not  necessary  a  reflection  of  
actual  innovation  –  will  be  most  widespread  in  common-­‐‑law,  and  hence  liberal  
market,  systems.  This  distortion  may  help  explain  why,  according  to  Estevez-­‐‑  
Abe,  Iversen  and  Soskice,  New  Zealand  has  more  radical  technological  innovative  
capacity  than  Germany,  Sweden  or  Switzerland.17  
The  LME  type  of  economy  depends  on  labour  markets  that  set  wages  through  
pure  competition  and  permit  very  little  regulation  to  protect  employees  from  insecurity,  
and  on  a  primary  role  for  stock  markets  and  the  maximisation  of  shareholder  
value  in  achieving  economic  goals.  Such  an  economy  is  considered  by  
the  authors  to  be  poor  at  making  minor  adaptive  innovations,  because  employers  
make  inadequate  investment  in  employee  skills  which  might  produce  such  innovations;  
but  it  excels  at  radical  innovations,  because  the  combination  of  free  
labour  markets  and  external  shareholders  makes  it  relatively  easy  to  switch  
resources  rapidly  to  new  and  profitable  firms  and  areas  of  activity.  A  CME,  featuring  
corporatist  wage-­‐‑setting,  strongly  regulated  labour  markets  and  corporate  
financing  through  long-­‐‑term  commitments  by  banks,  follows  exactly  the  reverse  
logic.  
The  authors  stress  strongly  that  they  are  depicting  two  enduring  Q3  forms  of  capitalism,  
because  each  has  different  comparative  advantages.  However,  those  of  the  
CME  form  are  located  solely  in  minor  adaptations  within  traditional  and  declining  
industries,  while  LMEs  have  assigned  to  them  all  future-­‐‑oriented  industries  and  
services  sectors.  In  the  end,  therefore,  this  is  a  neoinstitutionalism  that  fully  
accepts  the  logic  of  neoclassicism  set  out  above:  in  the  long  run,  all  institutions  
other  than  the  pure  market  fail  to  cope  with  the  future.  Since  these  different  
forms  of  capitalism  are  considered  to  have  been  the  products  of  historical  
longues  dure´es,  it  also  means  that  the  German  economy  never  was  radically  innovative  
in  the  past,  which  requires  explaining  away  many  past  events  in  the  economic  
history  of  such  German  industries  as  chemicals,  machinery,  steel  and  motor  
vehicles  when  these  sectors  were  at  the  forefront  of  technological  advance.  
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This  brings  us  to  a  further  fundamental  point:  typologies  of  this  kind  are  fixed  
over  time;  they  make  no  provision  for  changes  in  characteristics.  As  Zeitlin  puts  it,  
approaches  like  that  of  Hall  and  Soskice  render  learning  almost  impossible.  Or,  as  
Bertoldi  says,  they  ignore  any  impact  of  change  in  world  economy  and  make  no  
allowance  for  evolutionary  development.  As  Hay  has  it,  this  literature  tends  to  
take  either  a  spatialising  approach  (the  elaboration  of  models,  as  in  the  cases  we  
are  discussing  here)  or  a  temporalising  one  (identifying  historical  phases,  and  
therefore  probably  giving  more  scope  to  actors’  capacity  to  change,  but  ignoring  
synchronic  diversity.)  It  is  not  necessary  for  neoinstitutionalist  analysis  to  be  as  
rigid  as  this.18  
Hall  and  Soskice  also  assume  automatically  that  all  innovation  within  new  
industries  represents  radical  innovation,  while  all  within  old  ones  can  represent  
only  incremental  innovation.  This  is  because  they  use  different  sectors  as  
proxies  for  different  types  of  innovation.  According  to  such  an  approach,  when  
Microsoft  launches  another  mildly  changed  version  of  Windows  it  still  represents  
radical  innovation,  because  information  technology  is  seen  as  a  radical  innovation  
industry;  but  when  some  firms  eventually  launch  the  hydrogen-­‐‑fuelled  motor  
engine,  this  will  only  be  an  incremental  innovation,  because  the  motor  industry  
is  an  old  industry.  Further,  the  authors  do  not  confront  the  leading  position  of  
two  clearly  CMEs  (Finland  and  Sweden)  in  new  telecommunications  technologies  
and  the  Nordic  countries  generally  in  medical  technologies.19  Robert  Boyer  has  
shown  that  the  institutional  pattern  found  in  the  Nordic  countries  can  favour  
high-­‐‑technology  growth  in  information  and  communication  technologies  as  
much  as  the  Anglo-­‐‑American  one.  This  is  completely  lost  in  accounts  that  insist  
on  dualism  and  an  a-­‐‑priori  allocation  of  institutional  patterns.20  Instead  of  the  
a-­‐‑priori  paradigm  case  methodology,  Boyer  used  Charles  Ragin’s  Booleian  techniques  
to  derive  institutional  patterns  empirically.21  Booleian  algebra  assigns  category  
values  (not  interval  ones)  to  the  mass  of  characteristics  that  constitute  a  
whole.  Individual  characteristics  are  identified  as  either  present  or  absent.  This  
enables  a  search  for  shared  characteristics  in  a  number  of  complex  empirical  
cases,  assisting  the  researcher  to  determine  which  characteristics  tend  to  be  
found  together,  and  which  are  rarely  or  never  associated.  
A  further  serious  flaw  in  the  Varieties  of  Capitalism  approach  is  that  it  misunderstands  
the  work  of  individual  innovative  companies.  While  engaging  in  radical  
innovation,  firms  usually  also  need  to  bring  out  products  with  minor  improvements  
in  order  to  sustain  their  position  in  markets  while  they  wait  for  a  radical  innovation  
to  bear  fruit;  but,  according  to  the  Hall-­‐‑Soskice  model,  it  is  not  possible  for  firms  
within  an  LME  to  succeed  at  incremental  innovation.  It  is  a  major  advance  of  the  
approach  that  they  focus  on  the  firm  as  an  actor,  rather  than  take  a  macroeconomic  
approach  to  the  study  of  economic  success.  However,  many  of  the  advantages  of  
this  are  vitiated  by  the  fact  that  their  model  allows  the  firm  virtually  no  autonomy  
outside  its  national  macroeconomic  context.  
These  authors  further  follow  conventional  wisdom  in  arguing  that  the  superiority  
of  American  (or  Anglophone)  firms  over  German  ones  results  from  the  fact  that  
in  the  Anglophone  countries  all  managerial  power  is  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  
chief  executive  officer  (CEO)  who  is  required  to  maximise  shareholder  value,  
with  employees  engaged  on  a  hire-­‐‑and-­‐‑fire  basis  with  no  representative  channels  
Colin  Crouch  
444  
available  to  them.  Here  they  are  failing  to  distinguish  between  the  firm  as  an  
organisation  and  as  a  marketplace.  By  seeing  the  CEO’s  power  as  being  solely  
to  maximise  share  values  by  the  use  of  a  hire-­‐‑and-­‐‑fire  approach  to  management,  
they  are  able  to  present  the  firm  in  an  LME  as  solely  the  latter  and  not  as  an  
organisation.  
They  can  therefore  dispense  with  the  knowledge  accumulated  in  the  theory  
of  the  firm,  which  distinguishes  between  market  and  organisation,  and  presents  at  
least  the  large  firm  as  an  organisation  with  personnel  policies,  and  with  management  
having  a  wider  range  of  discretion  and  possibilities  than  just  maximising  
share  values.  
This  is  significant.  In  reality  firms  differ  considerably  in  the  extent  to  which  
they  construct  organisational  systems,  internal  labour  markets,  and  distinctive  
ways  of  working,  even  developing  specific  corporate  cultures,  rather  than  
simply  establishing  themselves  as  spaces  where  a  number  of  markets  intersect.  
For  example,  a  firm  that  develops  a  distinctive  approach  to  work  among  its  workforce  
as  part  of  its  competitive  strategy  cannot  depend  on  a  hire-­‐‑and-­‐‑hire  personnel  
policy.  Employees  need  to  be  inducted  into  the  firm’s  approach  and  are  likely  to  
demand  some  understandings  about  security  if  they  are  to  commit  themselves  in  
the  way  that  management  wants.  Rapid  hire-­‐‑and-­‐‑fire  meets  neither  of  these  
needs.  This  fundamental  difference  in  corporate  strategy  has  nothing  at  all  to  do  
with  differences  between  LMEs  and  CMEs;  both  can  exist  within  either,  particularly  
the  former.  Neglect  of  the  firm  as  an  organisation  is  thus  a  weakness  of  much  
neoinstitutionalist  analysis.  It  is  caused  by  the  obsession  already  noted  with  a  
dichotomy  between  two  mutually  incompatible  politico-­‐‑economic  ideologies,  a  
dichotomy  in  which  the  distinction  between  firm  and  market  is  not  at  issue.  At  
times  Hall  and  Soskice  seem  to  regard  the  organisational  structure  of  the  firm  
(or  corporate  hierarchy)  as  a  characteristic  of  both  LMEs  and  CMEs,  and  therefore  
an  irrelevant  variable  -­‐‑  though  it  should  be  conceded  that  the  relevant  passage  is  
worded  ambiguously,  as  follows:  
All  capitalist  economies  also  contain  the  hierarchies  that  firms  construct  
to  resolve  problems  that  markets  do  not  address  adequately  
.  .  ..  In  liberal  market  economies,  these  are  the  institutions  on  
which  firms  rely  to  develop  the  relations  on  which  their  core  competences  
depend.22  
They  seem  here  to  be  building  into  their  model  a  functionalist  balancing  item,  
implying  that  hierarchy  will  exist  to  the  extent  that  it  can  ‘resolve  problems’.  In  
that  case,  why  does  their  theory  not  build  into  the  features  of  both  LMEs  and  
CMEs  those  that  they  would  respectively  need  in  order  to  have  them  cope  with  
the  kinds  of  innovation  that  their  theory  says  is  impossible  for  them?  At  the  
level  of  type-­‐‑building  one  should  not  pick  and  choose  which  institutional  features  
automatically  receive  compensation  and  which  do  not.  As  Weber  originally  formulated  
the  concept,  ideal  types  are  ‘one-­‐‑sided  accentuations’,  pressing  home  
the  logical  implications  of  a  particular  kind  of  structure.  The  aim  is  not  to  
provide  an  accurate  empirical  description,  but  a  theoretical  category,  to  be  used  
in  the  construction  of  hypotheses.  Again,  the  authors  are  not  building  their  
theory  deductively,  but  are  reading  back  empirical  detail  from  what  they  want  
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to  be  their  paradigm  case  of  an  LME  –  the  US  –  into  their  formulation  of  the  type.  
It  is  simply  not  possible  within  their  methodological  approach  to  ask  the  question:  
is  everything  important  that  occurs  in  the  US  economy  the  embodiment  of  free  
markets?  
Hall  and  Soskice  do  briefly  consider  diversity  within  the  CME  form.  Apart  from  
Germany,  they  also  see  Japan,  Switzerland,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium,  Sweden,  
Norway,  Denmark,  Finland  and  Austria  as  unproblematic–though  differences  
between  what  they  call  ‘industry-­‐‑based’  coordination  of  the  German  type  and  
‘group-­‐‑based’  coordination  found  in  Japan  and  Korea  are  recognised.23  In  an  
earlier  work  Soskice  fully  recognized  these  two  distinct  forms  of  CME:  a  northern  
European  model,  and  the  ‘group-­‐‑coordinated’  East  Asian  economies.24  (‘Northern  
Europe’  is  here  defined  by  Soskice  to  include  Italy  but  not  France.)  But  not  much  
is  made  of  the  distinction  in  the  full  development  of  theory  or  cases.  
A  ‘Mediterranean’  group  (France,  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal,  Greece,  and  Turkey)  is  
also  given  some  recognition.  Like  Albert  before  them,  Hall  and  Soskice  accept  
that  France  is  somehow  different,  and  consider  that  a  so-­‐‑called  southern  European  
group  (including  France)  probably  constitute  a  third,  state-­‐‑led,  post-­‐‑agrarian  
model.25  This  at  least  makes  matters  more  differentiated,  although  it  produces  a  
type  curiously  unable  to  distinguish  between  the  French  state  and  the  Italian  or  
Greek  ones.  Sometimes  this  ‘Mediterranean’  group  is  seen  as  being  empirically  
poised  somewhere  between  the  LME  and  CME  model,  which  enables  the  
authors  to  insist  that  LME  and  CME  remain  the  only  points  which  require  theoretical  
definition.  But  elsewhere  the  Mediterranean  countries  are  treated  as  
examples  of  CMEs;  Thelen,  for  example,  treats  Italy  as  almost  unambiguously  
a  ‘German-­‐‑type’  ‘coordinated’  economy.26  One  of  the  starting  points  of  the  
model  was  an  earlier  paper  by  Soskice  criticising  the  Calmfors  and  Driffill  
model  of  wage  bargaining.27  This  model  had  contrasted  economies  with  centralised  
and  decentralised  collective  bargaining  arrangements,  classing  the  French,  
Italian  and  Japanese  among  the  latter.  Soskice  pointed  out  that,  although  these  
three  countries  were  not  as  coordinated  as  Germany  or  Sweden,  one  could  identify  
within  them  various  mechanisms  that  ensured  some  coordination  of  wage  bargaining.  
He  found  (within  the  sample  of  countries  being  considered)  that  only  the  UK  
and  the  USA  lacked  such  mechanisms;  therefore  all  other  cases  were  classified  as  
CMEs.  Both  here  and  in  Hall  and  Soskice,  the  basic  drive  of  the  dichotomy  is  to  
confront  the  neoclassical  model  with  a  single  rival  type.  
Beyond  dichotomies  
Some  contributors  to  the  study  of  capitalist  diversity  have  gone  beyond  dichotomies.  
Vivien  Schmidt  has  three  models  of  European  capitalism:  ‘market’  (very  
similar  to  the  LME  model),  ‘managed’  (with  an  ‘enabling’  state  that  encourages  
economic  actors  to  cooperate,  more  or  less  the  CME  model)  and  ‘state’  (an  
interventionist  
state  of  the  French  kind).28  The  last  is  designed  to  remedy  the  neglect  of  
this  form  by  Hall  and  Soskice.  Acknowledging  that  the  role  of  the  state  has  
declined  considerably  in  France  in  recent  years,  she  points  out  that  its  background  
role  and  historical  legacy  remain  of  considerable  importance  in  enhancing  national  
economic  capacity.  But,  indeed,  much  the  same  could  be  said  of  the  US  state,  
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whose  role  in  the  vast  defence-­‐‑related  sector  could  well  be  defined  as  ‘state  
enhancement’  of  economic  capacity.  Schmidt  also  manages  to  be  sensitive  both  
to  change  and  to  its  timing.29  She  studies  how  countries  embodying  each  of  
these  types  respond  to  the  challenges  of  globalisation  and  Europeanisation.  A  
central  hypothesis  is  that  these  challenges  do  not  lead  to  simple  convergence.  
Governments  of  the  various  countries  have  responded  in  complex  ways,  producing  
new  forms  of  diversity.  If  there  is  any  overall  convergence,  it  is  mainly  towards  a  
loss  of  extreme  characteristics  and  thus  some  sharing  of  attributes  from  the  various  
models.  And  these  diversities  are  full  of  interesting  paradoxes:  the  UK,  having  had  
in  many  respects  the  weakest  economy  of  the  three,  was  thus  the  earliest  to  be  
forced  to  come  to  terms  with  the  pressures  of  globalisation.  As  a  result,  it  now  
appears  better  prepared  to  face  that  challenge  than  Germany  which,  being  initially  
the  strongest  economically,  could  delay  adjustment.  
A  second  hypothesis  fundamental  to  her  study  is  that  political  discourse  has  
been  particularly  important  in  shaping  national  responses  to  the  challenge.  By  
this  Schmidt  means,  not  just  that  different  substantive  discourses  were  adopted,  
but  that  these  took  different  forms.  She  distinguishes  between  ‘communicative’  
and  ‘coordinating’  discourse  forms.  The  former,  more  suited  to  centralised  
systems  like  the  British  and  French,  inform  the  public  of  what  needs  to  be  
done;  the  latter,  more  typical  of  Germany,  is  used  to  develop  consensus  among  
powerful  actors  who  cannot  be  controlled  from  the  centre.  This  work  therefore  
marks  a  refreshing  shift  towards  an  actor-­‐‑centred  and  non-­‐‑determinist  account.  
Schmidt  by  no  means  discounts  the  existence  of  very  strong  structures,  within  
which  her  actors  need  to  operate.  But  these  are  malleable  by  innovative  actors,  
in  particular  by  politics.  She  criticises  particularly  effectively  the  oversimplified  
accounts  that  characterise  much  rational  choice  work  in  international  political  
economy.  This,  she  argues,  is  a  curiously  depoliticised  form  of  study  of  politics,  
assuming  as  it  does  that  the  interests  of  nation-­‐‑states  can  be  modelled  in  a  
straightforward  
way,  with  fixed,  consciously  held  preferences.  She  demonstrates  effectively  
how  governments  in  the  three  countries  of  concern  to  her  study  
developed  very  varied  positions  in  relation  to  Europeanisation:  for  example,  the  
UK  was  quickest  to  respond  to  many  of  the  single  market  initiatives,  but  
slowest  to  the  single  currency.  This  can  all  be  explained,  and  she  provides  good  
explanations,  but  these  require  tactical  and  historically  contingent  political  actors.  
But  Schmidt  still  follows  the  practice  of  identifying  empirical  cases  as  standing  
for  ideal  types.  This  is  unfortunate,  because  her  own  actual  practice  is  well  able  to  
cope  with  the  implications  of  seeing  cases  as  amalgams  of  types:  her  actors  are  
creative  political  schemers,  looking  for  chances  to  change  and  innovate,  not  automata  
acting  out  the  parts  the  theorist  has  set  for  them.  And,  as  noted,  she  succeeds  
in  showing  how  over  time  individual  countries  have  moved  around  the  triangular  
space  which  her  particular  model  of  types  of  capitalism  allows  them.  
Several  other  authors  present  three  or  more  forms  of  capitalism,  or  of  elements  
of  capitalism,  nearly  always  retaining  a  geocultural  approach.  Gøsta  Esping-­‐‑  
Andersen’s  analysis  of  different  types  of  welfare  state  embodies  variables  relating  
to  the  outcomes  of  political  struggle,  or  dominant  political  traditions,  which  avoids  
some  of  the  functionalist  implications  of  the  Varieties  of  Capitalism  model.30  
Again,  one  starting  point  is  free-­‐‑market  or  liberal  capitalism  associated  with  the  
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Anglophone  group  of  countries,  and  another  is  Germany,  producing  a  conservative,  
‘continental  European’  model.  There  is,  however,  a  third,  social-­‐‑democratic  
pole,  geographically  associated  with  Scandinavia.  Critics  of  Esping-­‐‑Andersen’s  
model  have  concentrated:  on  identifying  mixed  cases  (Castles  and  Mitchell);  on  
stressing  how  the  treatment  of  women  in  different  systems  does  not  seem  to  
correspond  to  the  simple  typology  (Daly);  or  on  breaking  up  the  over-­‐‑extended  
‘conservative  continental’  category.  A  fourth  type  has  now  been  clearly  
established,  separating  southern  European  welfare  states  from  this  one  on  the  
basis  of  their  particularly  large  role  for  the  family  (Naldini)  and  other  informal  
institutions  (Ferrera).  Ebbinghaus,  concentrating  on  policies  for  combatting  
early  exit  from  the  labour  market,  which  he  sees  as  deeply  related  to  the  form  
of  the  overall  welfare  regime,  adds  a  fifth  type  based  on  Japan.  All  these  works  
continue  to  depend  on  the  characteristics  of  paradigm  cases,  which  can  be  
highly  misleading.  For  example,  Viebrock,  in  a  study  of  different  forms  of  
unemployment  
benefit  systems,  has  shown  how  Sweden  –  usually  the  absolute  
paradigm  case  of  social  democracy  –  has  for  reasons  of  political  history  retained  
a  role  for  voluntary  associations  alongside  the  state  in  the  organisation  of  its  
unemployment  
insurance  system.31  
A  strong  move  away  from  dualism,  which  neither  starts  from  nor  privileges  the  
free-­‐‑market  model,  is  the  scheme  of  Richard  Whitley.32  He  builds  up  a  set  of  fully  
sociological  models  of  capitalism  based  on  six  types  of  business  system  (fragmented,  
coordinated  industrial  district,  compartmentalised,  state-­‐‑organised,  collaborative,  
and  highly  coordinated),  related  to  a  number  of  different  behavioural  
characteristics.33  He  also  presents  five  different  ideal  types  of  firms  (opportunist,  
artisan,  isolated  hierarchy,  collaborative  hierarchy,  allied  hierarchy)34  and  a  diversity  
of  links  between  these  types  and  certain  fundamental  institutional  contexts  
(the  state  financial  system,  skill  development  and  control,  trust  and  authority  
relations).35  Significantly,  Whitley’s  main  fields  of  study  are  Japan,  Korea,  
Taiwan  and  other  Far  Eastern  economies,  rather  than  either  the  American  or  the  
German  cases,  and  he  is  therefore  further  removed  from  the  obsession  with  
neoliberalism  and  a  contrast  between  it  and  a  model  of  ‘organised  capitalism’  
that  sometimes  distorts  the  analysis  of  those  who  concentrate  on  Western  
Europe  and  North  America.  
By  far  the  best  and  most  sophisticated  approach  to  a  ‘post-­‐‑dualist’  typology  of  
capitalism  to  date  is  that  established  by  Bruno  Amable.  36  He  collected  quantitative  
data  on  a  vast  range  of  characteristics  of  the  national  economies  of  most  OECD  
countries:  product  markets,  labour  markets,  financial  systems  and  social  protection.  
He  uses  literally  dozens  of  individual  indicators  to  assess  each.  He  then  
allows  a  typology  of  groups  of  countries  to  be  formed  empirically  by  these  
data;  he  does  not  start  from  paradigm  cases.  This  procedure  gives  him  five  
groups,  which,  as  with  other  authors,  fall  into  familiar  geocultural  patterns:  
market-­‐‑based  (primarily  Anglophone),  social  democratic  (Nordic),  Asian  (Japan  
and  Korea),  Mediterranean  (southern  European)  and  Continental  European  
(continental  Western  European  less  the  Nordic  and  Mediterranean  countries).  
He  further  finds  (as  have  other.37)  that  this  last  group  does  not  show  much  internal  
coherence,  and  for  some  purposes  splits  it  further  into  two  sub-­‐‑groups:  one  comprising  
the  Netherlands  and  Switzerland,  the  other  Austria,  Belgium,  France  and  
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Germany.  Moreover,  Amable  is  not  afraid  to  draw  attention  to  further  diversity  for  
some  of  the  characteristics,  with  the  result  that  countries  do  not  always  figure  
within  their  normal  group.  
At  times  Amable  lapses  from  his  finely  nuanced  stance.  For  example,  the  book  
ends  with  a  future-­‐‑  and  policy-­‐‑oriented  dialectic  between  the  market-­‐‑based  and  a  
simplified  and  generalised  Continental  European  model.38  It  seems  that  engaging  
in  the  rhetoric  of  debate  about  the  future  course  of  capitalism  leads  always  to  
dualism,  even  when,  as  in  Amable’s  case,  the  best  strength  of  the  author’s  position  
lies  precisely  in  the  demonstration  of  a  far  more  differentiated  world.  He  also  
depends  necessarily  for  his  data  on  sources  like  the  OECD  which  are  often  
constructed  with  in-­‐‑built  biases.  For  example,  although  at  one  point  Amable  
acknowledges  the  importance  of  military-­‐‑related  research  and  production  in  
many  of  the  high-­‐‑tech  sectors  of  the  US  economy,  he  follows  the  OECD  in  excluding  
all  consideration  of  this  from  the  indicators  of  the  role  of  the  state  in  the  
economy  and  of  the  regulation  of  external  trade.39  These  minor  criticisms  
apart,  Amable  has  demonstrated  that  a  genuinely  scientific  approach,  using  very  
extensive  and  diverse  kinds  of  data,  produces  a  useful  and  coherent  typology  
comprising  
five  or  six  types,  at  the  same  time  enabling  clear  recognition  of  exceptions  
within  types.  
Dichotomisers  will  argue  that  they  are  applying  the  principle  of  parsimony  and  
Occam’s  razor  to  complex  schemes  of  Amable’s  or  Whitley’s  kind.  They  will  
claim  that,  while  there  is  clearly  a  loss  of  information  if  one  collapses  Whitley’s  
‘coordinated  Q4  industrial  district,  compartmentalised,  state-­‐‑organised,  collaborative,  
and  highly  coordinated’  mechanisms  into  the  single  idea  of  a  CME,  that  idea  
seizes  on  the  essential  point  that  divides  all  these  forms  from  the  pure  market  
one:  coordination.  But,  as  Scott  and  Hay  have  separately  argued,  parsimony  
must  not  become  an  excuse  for  inaccuracy  and  ignoring  important  diversity.40  
Is  coordination  the  fundamental  attribute  of  all  the  types  in  Whitley’s  list?  On  
what  grounds  could  this  quality  be  regarded  as  more  fundamental  than  the  other  
characteristics  which  divide  then,  especially  since  the  coordination  takes  place  
at  very  different  levels?  Recent  developments  in  the  governance  approach  draw  
attention  to  the  role  of  collective  competition  goods  provided  by  various  
governance  modes  in  local  economies,  without  demonstrating  anything  
remotely  strong  enough  to  be  called  national  ‘coordination’.41  This  suggests  the  
possibility  of  analyses  more  moderate  than  those  addressed  at  the  whole  
macroeconomy.  
Meanwhile,  Hage  and  Alter  have  convincingly  demonstrated  analytical  distinctions  
among  several  institutional  forms.42  In  that  case,  to  apply  Occam’s  razor  to  
reduce  them  all  to  one  idea  of  coordination  is  to  cut  into  serious  theoretical  and  
empirical  flesh.  An  explanation  becomes  more  parsimonious  than  another  when  
it  uses  a  smaller  number  of  explanatory  variables  while  explaining  at  least  as  
much  as  its  opponent.  For  example,  it  is  more  parsimonious  to  model  the  solar  
system  as  heliocentric  than  terracentric,  because  the  former  uses  far  simpler  
mathematics  to  account  for  at  least  as  many  planetary  movements  as  the  latter.  
We  should  be  far  less  impressed  with  the  heliocentrist  if  she  had  to  say:  ‘Forget  
about  the  outer  planets;  this  theory  is  more  parsimonious  because  it  just  looks  at  
the  inner  ones.  But  contemporary  social  science  often  makes  use  of  precisely  
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this  kind  of  argument,  using  the  idea  of  parsimony  as  meaning  a  kind  of  rough,  
tough  macho-­‐‑theory  that  concentrates  on  the  big  picture  and  ignores  detail.  
As  Whitley’s  formulations  demonstrate,  the  relationships  between  different  
forms  and  different  behavioural  characteristics  present  a  varied  patchwork  of  
similarities  and  differences,  not  a  set  of  polar  contrasts.  This  suggests  in  turn  
the  fundamental  point:  that  individual  empirical  cases  might  well  comprise  
more  complex  amalgams  still  of  elements  from  two  or  more  theoretical  types.  
Whitley  himself  treats  a  fragmented  market  model  of  economic  organisation  separately  
from  one  dominated  by  large  firms,  and  is  therefore  able  to  see  the  US  itself  
as  a  hybrid  of  two  different  forms  of  capitalism  rather  than  a  pure  case.  This  question  
has  considerable  practical  implications,  which  are  discussed  more  fully  elsewhere.  
43  It  is  often  recognised  by  authors  who  speak  of  ‘hybrid’  forms.  For  
example,  Schmidt  suggests  strongly  that  some  changes  in  French  institutions  
are  making  that  case  increasingly  a  hybrid,  with  borrowing  from  Germany  as  
well  as  from  neoliberal  sources.44  Jackson  suggests  that  hybridisation,  
as  opposed  to  simple  imitation  of  the  exogenous,  is  the  usual  outcome  of  attempts  
at  ‘borrowing’  institutions,  even  under  extreme  periods  of  transition,  such  as  
Germany  or  Japan  under  postwar  occupation.45  Other  researche’s  have  shown  
the  power  of  hybrid  cases  in  achieving  important  reforms  in  welfare  state  organisation.  
46  Zeitlin  discusses  various  national  cases  that  have  become  exceptions  to  
their  ‘types’  as  the  result  of  mixing  institutional  forms  at  the  initiative  of  what  I  
would  call  institutional  entrepreneurs.  Considering  an  earlier  period,  Windolf  discusses  
how  French  family  capitalism  played  an  important  part  in  the  country’s  
postwar  modernisation,  merging  with  advanced  financial  means  of  control  and  
the  strong  state  to  produce  a  dynamic  new  model.  ‘Hybridisation’  deals  with  
only  one  way  in  which  cases  may  deviate  from  types,  and  it  is  still  very  close  
to  the  idea  of  clear,  macro-­‐‑level  types,  because  it  sees  these  as  the  source  of  the  
hybridisation.  However,  it  does  constitute  an  important  challenge  to  simple  
equations  of  cases  and  types.47  
Questioning  the  centrality  of  the  nation-­‐‑state  
The  centrality  of  the  nation-­‐‑state  in  most  typologies  of  capitalist  diversity  also  
needs  to  be  questioned.  This  centrality  is  found  in  most  neoinstitutionalist  
studies,  including  those  on  ‘social  [that  is,  national]  systems  of  innovation  and  
production’.  
48  It  is  also  central  to  work  from  the  parallel  but  distinct  literature  on  
‘national  systems  of  innovation’.49  At  one  level  the  case  is  well  made.  Very  extensive  
elements  of  governance  in  the  industrial  and  post-­‐‑industrial  societies  of  which  
we  have  knowledge  do  operate  at  the  level  of  the  nation-­‐‑state:  states  have  been  the  
main  sources  of  law,  and  most  associations  and  organisations  target  themselves  at  
the  state.50  Given  that  markets  are  framed  by  law,  this  means  that,  of  the  modes  of  
governance  usually  discussed  in  governance  theory,  the  state  itself  (obviously),  
markets  and  various  levels  of  associations  are  all  heavily  defined  at  national  
level,  while  community  and  informal  associations  exist  at  a  lower  geographical  
level.  Even  research  that  explicitly  works  at  comparisons  between  regional  or  
other  substate  geographical  levels  often  has  to  acknowledge  the  importance  of  
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the  nation-­‐‑state  as  a  major  instance  for  the  determination  of  socioeconomic  
variables.51  
But  many  macro-­‐‑level  neoinstitutionalists  go  further  than  this  and  postulate  
virtually  hermetically  sealed  national  institutions  –  often  because  they  are  concerned  
to  address  debates  about  economic  and  social  policy,  and  these  are  
mainly  conducted  at  national  levels.  Radice  argues  that  this  has  perhaps  been  
particularly  the  case  for  left-­‐‑of-­‐‑centre  analysts  desiring  to  ‘bring  the  state  back  
in’,  leading  to  an  exaggeration  of  the  importance  of  national  policy.52  More  generally,  
neoinstitutionalists  are  led  to  stress  the  nation-­‐‑state  by  their  functionalist  
assumptions,  which  model  discrete,  autonomous  systems,  each  equipped  with  
their  sets  of  institutions,  like  a  body  with  its  organs.  There  are  also  methodological  
advantages  in  being  able  to  treat  nation-­‐‑states  as  discrete  units  of  analysis,  as  many  
economic  data  are  produced  at  national  levels.  Theorists  of  the  diversity  of  capitalism  
are  therefore  eager  to  play  down  the  implications  of  globalisation,  and  argue  
intelligently  and  forcefully  against  the  naive  assumptions  of  much  other  literature  
that  globalization  somehow  abolishes  the  significance  of  national  differences.53  
However,  the  position  of  the  nation-­‐‑state  as  the  definer  of  the  boundaries  of  
cases  is  not  so  fixed  that  it  should  be  taken  for  granted  per  definitionem.  This  is  
particularly  obvious  with  respect  to  multinational  corporations.  As  Beyer  
shows,54  large  firms  draw  on  resources  from  a  range  of  different  national  bases;  
it  is  very  difficult  to  identify  them  with  particular  national  types  and  to  see  their  
institutional  possibilities  as  being  constrained  by  their  country  or  countries  of  
location.  As  Jackson  puts  it,  national  models  of  capitalism  are  becoming  ‘institutionally  
incomplete’.55  This  seems  particularly  true  where  international  corporations  
are  concerned,  but  even  firms  that  are  nationally  owned  and  operate  
primarily  within  one  nation-­‐‑state  have  access  to  knowledge,  links  and  practices  
existing  outside  the  national  borders.  Radice  similarly  criticises  the  national  innovation  
system  literature  for  a  kind  of  mercantilism,  arguing  that  it  does  not  take  
adequate  account  of  the  fact  that  technology  is  always  a  public/private  collaboration,  
and  that  the  private  actors  are  usually  global  firms.  Something  always  
‘leaks’  abroad  from  national  programmes;  innovation  is  at  once  global  and  
national.56  He  also  points  out  the  falsity  of  the  dichotomy  between  so-­‐‑called  
globalising  and  national  forces,  as  though  one  could  identify  them  and  then  establish  
their  relative  importance.57  The  phenomena  associated  with  globalisation  
are  brought  about  at  the  behest  of  domestic  actors  working  to  influence  national  
governments.  As  Helleiner  earlier  made  the  point:  internationalisation  is  not  an  
independent  variable,  because  it  is  an  outcome  of  state  policy.58  
Radice  demonstrates  a  different  weakness  of  nation-­‐‑state  based  analysis  by  
pointing  out  that  all  states  are  not  equal  as  units.59  The  US  is  able  to  borrow  to  
fund  its  deficits  in  a  way  not  available  to  others,  which  means  that  comparing  
the  ‘performance’  of  that  economy  with  others  is  not  a  true  comparison  of  institutional  
capacities.  One  can  move  from  that  observation  to  point  out  that  
nation-­‐‑states  cannot  always  be  treated  as  a  series  of  unit  instances  of  the  same  
phenomenon;  they  are  also  linked  together  in  a  hierarchical  way  to  form  an  
overall  system,  as  Wallerstein  and  other  world  system  analysts  have  showed.60  
For  example,  the  units  ‘Portugal’  and  ‘France’  cannot  be  treated  as  equal  units  
within  which  the  effects  of  various  independent  variables  can  be  independently  
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and  comparatively  assessed,  because  they  are  partly  defined  by  their  relationship  
to  each  other.  Scott  stresses  the  need  to  consider  a  range  of  levels:  world  system,  
society  (nation-­‐‑state),  organisational  field,  organisational  population,  organisation  
and  organisational  subsystem.61  As  he  points  out,  different  disciplines  tend  to  look  
at  different  components  of  this.  Hollingsworth  and  Boyer  are  helpfully  explicit  
that  their  scheme  can  be  used  at  subnational  and  transnational,  as  well  as  national  
levels.62  We  need  always  to  be  able  to  ask:  are  arguments  about  the  characteristics  
of  national  economies  limited  to  specific  economic  sectors  and  industrial  
branches,  or  do  they  claim  to  apply  to  all?  And  how  far  beyond  the  heartland  of  
the  economy  does  the  theory  claim  to  range?  If  the  nation-­‐‑state  is  at  the  heart  
of  the  analysis,  are  political  institutions  also  to  be  covered  by  the  characterisation?  
Or  does  the  theory  apply  even  further,  to  structures  like  the  welfare  state,  family  or  
religion,  for  example?  As  we  develop  thinking  of  this  kind,  we  soon  come  to  see  
that  the  clear  division  between  endogenous  and  exogenous  that  is  so  fundamental  
to  nation-­‐‑state-­‐‑based  theories  becomes  replaced  by  a  continuum  of  accessibility.  
Towards  a  new  analytical  approach:  anticipating  recombinant  capitalism  
As  noted  at  the  outset,  most  contributions  to  the  literature  on  the  diversity  of  capitalism  
conflate  theoretical  models  and  empirical  cases  through  a  research  strategy  
that  seeks  the  unique  theoretical  box  to  which  an  individual  case  must  be  assigned.  
For  example,  Goodin  et  al.,  while  arguing  that  the  USA  constitutes  a  pure  type  of  
‘market’  welfare  regime,  acknowledge  that  80  percent  of  US  social  protection  
expenditure  goes  to  social  insurance  schemes  of  a  corporatist  nature  and  not  to  
the  means-­‐‑tested  schemes  associated  with  the  market  model.63  However,  
because  they  consider  that  this  is  a  smaller  proportion  than  goes  to  such  
schemes  in  other  cases,  they  claim  that  they  are  justified  in  regarding  the  US  as  
a  paradigm  of  the  ‘pure’  market  model.  They  do  not  consider  the  possibility  
that  the  corporatist  elements  of  the  welfare  system  might  act  complementarily  
to  the  market  process  in  the  US  case,  and  that  the  US  system  might  operate  differently  
if  it  really  was  a  pure  market  one.  In  fact,  the  differences  that  have  been  
identified  among  neoinstitutionalist  theories  have  major  implications  for  how  
they  relate  theoretical  models  and  empirical  cases.  There  are  broadly  two  ways  
of  doing  this:  the  labelling  method  and  the  analytical  method.  The  two  approaches  
are  analogous  to  the  two  different  forms  of  categorisation  found  on  bottles  of  
mineral  water:  first,  the  water  is  labelled  as  either  still  or  sparkling  –  the  water  
‘is’  unambiguously,  one  or  other  of  these  types;  second  there  is  set  out  a  detailed  
chemical  analysis  of  elements  and  compounds,  traces  of  which  can  be  found  in  the  
water  –  the  water  contains’  these  chemicals.  
The  neoinstitutionalist  researcher  following  the  labelling  strategy  inspects  the  
characteristics  of  an  empirical  case  and  decides  which  of  a  limited  number  of  
theoretical  models  (ideally  two)  it  most  closely  resembles.  The  case  is  then  considered  
to  be  ‘an  example’  of  that  model  and  labelled  accordingly,  all  features  
of  it  which  do  not  fit  the  model  being  considered  as  ‘noise’  and  disregarded.  
A  clear  example  is  again  the  study  by  Goodins  et  al.,  which  takes  three  national  
cases  as  examples  of  three  models,  then  reads  back  empirical  features  of  these  
cases  into  the  models.  In  defence  of  such  procedures  Hollingsworth  claims  that,  
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even  if  an  individual  society  has  more  than  one  social  system  of  production,  one  
will  dominate.64  This  is  possibly  true,  but,  not  only  should  it  remain  an  hypothesis  
worth  testing  rather  than  an  a-­‐‑priori  methodological  assumption,  but  the  role  of  
‘minor’  or  hidden  institutional  forms  can  have  major  importance.  By  contrast,  
the  researcher  following  the  analytical  approach  considers  to  what  extent  traces  
of  each  of  a  series  of  models  can  be  found  within  the  case;  there  may  be  no  
conclusion  as  to  which  form  it  most  closely  resembles.  Even  if  there  is,  that  information  
remains  framed  in  the  context  of  the  wider  knowledge  of  its  attributes.  But  
it  is  also  necessary  to  recognise  weaknesses  of  the  analytical  approach.  We  rarely  
have  in  macrosociology  or  political  economy  measuring  instruments  of  the  kind  at  
the  disposal  of  the  chemist  analysing  the  mineral  water.  If  we  could  say:  ‘the  
Californian  economy  comprises  x  percent  pure  market  governance,  y  percent  
basic  state  support  and  z  percent  immigrant  community  dynamic  effects’  –  we  
would  be  saying  something  very  significant.  But  we  cannot;  we  can  only  say:  
‘the  impact  of  immigrant  communities  may  be  important  as  catalysts  for  innovation.’  
The  analytical  approach  thus  runs  the  risk  of  being  wrong-­‐‑footed  Q5  as  
less  ‘scientific’  by  an  alternative  presenting  a  false  scientific  precision.  
Labelling  works  best  when  there  is  only  a  limited  number  of  models  to  which  
cases  can  be  assigned,  but  these  models  embrace  a  wide  range  of  institutions  
without  worrying  about  excessive  complexity.  Conversely,  the  analytical  
method  is  most  likely  to  be  found  among  theories  that  accept  a  larger  number  
of  types  but  are  less  ambitious  in  their  institutional  coverage.  These  theories  
can  best  demonstrate  their  richness  when  showing  how  complex  an  individual  
case  can  be,  and  for  that  require  a  large  number  of  models  they  are  therefore  
only  really  feasible  when  a  limited  number  of  institutions  is  being  considered.  
The  strongest  point  of  the  labelling  approach  is  its  clarity.  The  designation  of  
still  or  sparkling  is  always  far  more  prominent  on  the  water  bottle  than  the  detailed  
chemical  analysis,  and  it  is  the  only  information  in  which  most  consumers  are  
interested.  Likewise,  policy  makers,  investors  and  other  users  of  social  research  
into  forms  of  capitalism  probably  want  to  know  simply:  ‘is  this  economy  like  
the  US  or  like  Germany?’  The  labelling  model  is  also  of  particular  value  when  
measuring  instruments  are  crude.  We  do  not  have  finely  tuned  ways  of  measuring  
elements  within  a  national  economy;  but  we  might  be  able  to  say  what  an  economy  
is  more  or  less  ‘like’  –  in  other  words,  which  simple  model  does  it  most  resemble?  
An  analytical  approach,  in  contrast,  is  able  to  depict  the  actors  within  its  cases  
as  confronting  an  empirical  complexity  made  up  of  elements  of  a  number  of  
models.  A  number  of  recent  studies  suggest  that  authors  are  becoming  more  
willing  to  accept  the  degree  of  complication  and  apparent  incoherence  that  this  
implies.65  If  these  actors  are  institutional  entrepreneurs,  then,  unlike  the  actors  
within  a  game  theory,  they  can  be  presented  as  having  the  capacity  to  try  to  
combine  these  elements  in  new  ways,  making  use  of  serendipitous  redundancies  
embedded  in  the  empirical  incongruences  of  their  situation.  As  theorist  and  
real-­‐‑world  actors  interact,  the  former  may  be  able  to  develop  new  theoretical  
cases  out  of  the  recombinant  institutions  produced  by  the  more  successful  of  
these  attempts.  The  two  approaches  present  opposed  logics  of  research.  What  is  
noise  for  the  labelling  approach  becomes  grist  for  the  mill  of  explaining  what  
actors  can  do  for  the  analytical  approach.  A  high  degree  of  diversity  within  a  
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case,  a  problem  for  labelling  theory,  becomes  for  an  analytical  theory  a  crucial  
independent  variable  for  explaining  capacity  for  change.  Under  the  conditions  
of  early  twenty-­‐‑first  century  capitalisms  there  is  not  a  question  of  whether  an  
economy  will  change,  but  how  it  is  doing  so.  The  accurate  study  of  this  situation  
surely  requires  a  shift  from  the  labelling  to  the  analytical  strategy.  
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